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Abstract The psychological literature now differenti-
ates between two types of psychopath: successful
(with little or no criminal record) and unsuccessful
(with a criminal record). Recent research indicates that
earlier findings of reduced autonomic activity, reduced
prefrontal grey matter, and compromised executive
activity may only be true of unsuccessful psychopaths.
In contrast, successful psychopaths actually show au-
tonomic and executive function that exceeds that of
normals, while having no difference in prefrontal vol-
ume from normals. We argue that many successful
psychopaths are legally responsible for their actions,
as they have the executive capacity to choose not to
harm (and thus are legally rational). However, many
unsuccessful psychopaths have a lack of executive
function that should at least partially excuse them from
criminal culpability. Although a successful psycho-
path's increased executive function may occur in con-
flict with, rather than in consonance with their
increased autonomic activity—producing a cognitive
style characterized by selfdeception and articulate-
sounding, but unsound reasoning—they may be
capable of recognizing and correcting their lack of
autonomic data, and thus can be held responsible.
Keywords Psychopathy . Criminal responsibility .
Executive function . Rationality
Psychopaths have been deemed by some philosophers
to be less criminally responsible than other offenders
because they lack personhood [1], moral knowledge
[2], or rationality [3]. However, the criminal courts do
not generally consider psychopathy to be an excusing
condition. By some estimates there are half a million
psychopaths currently in US prisons [4]. Some juries
are even willing to apply the highest level of culpabil-
ity and punishment to psychopaths: In 2010, an
Illinois jury sentenced murderer James Dugan to
death, despite hearing clear psychological and neuro-
scientific evidence that he was a psychopath [5].
While in the Dugan case psychopathy was offered as
a mitigating factor, interviews with career capital de-
fense attorneys suggest that evidence of psychopathy
is usually seen as an aggravating factor [6].
The disagreement regarding the culpability of psy-
chopaths appears to be grounded in a related dispute
about the cognitive capacities necessary for criminal
culpability. Although many psychopaths tend to have
normal, or even slightly above normal, IQs, they are
said to suffer from an inability to experience social or
“moral” emotions, including empathy. It has been
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argued that this inability to feel for their victims means
psychopaths don’t have access to certain reasons not
to act. However, autistic persons suffer similar deficits
and they do not tend to commit anti-social acts [7].
Indeed, they are less likely than the average person to
be entangled in the criminal justice system. Because
autistics are not likely to commit crimes, and are
generally not considered exempt from criminal re-
sponsibility if they should, deficits in empathy alone
cannot explain the psychopath’s behavior, or consti-
tute a legal excuse [7].
We will argue here that psychopaths’ cognitive
deficit is not best understood in terms of an inability
to experience certain emotions. Instead, we propose
that a better understanding of the law’s rationality
requirement, and the psychopath’s moral capacities,
can be gained by a study of the brain’s executive
function. When seen from this perspective, the dis-
agreement regarding psychopaths’ culpability can be
explained by the heterogeneous nature of the group
“psychopaths.” This heterogeneity is roughly captured
in the distinction between successful (with little or no
criminal record) and unsuccessful (with a criminal
record) psychopaths. We claim that many unsuccessful
psychopaths have a lack of executive function that
should at least partially excuse them from criminal
culpability. However, successful psychopaths may be
fully culpable, because they possess the executive
functions to allow them to notice and correct for their
criminal tendencies. Recent research indicates that
earlier findings of reduced autonomic activity [8, 9],
reduced prefrontal grey matter [10], and compromised
executive activity may only be true of unsuccessful
psychopaths. Yang et al. [11] found reduced orbito-
frontal gray-matter volumes in subjects with high-
psychopathic traits and criminal convictions, com-
pared to those who did not self-report convictions. In
some studies, successful psychopaths actually show
autonomic and executive function that exceeds that
of normals, while having no difference in prefrontal
volume from normals [12]. However, the successful
psychopath’s increased executive function, we hy-
pothesize, occurs in conflict with, rather than in con-
sonance with their increased autonomic activity. This
produces a cognitive style characterized by self-
deception and articulate-sounding, but unsound rea-
soning (even while they may be capable of correcting
a false inference). As psychopaths also have an in-
creased likelihood of possessing the traits of
narcissism and Machiavellianism—the so-called “dark
triad” [13] - successful psychopaths are uniquely
equipped to choose to cause harm. But we argue they
are legally responsible for their actions, as they have
the executive capacity to prevent themselves from
causing harm.
Finally, we will argue that diagnostics currently
used to assess psychopaths, including the Hare
Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) [14], are in-
adequate for the task of identifying the varying cogni-
tive profiles of psychopathy. The PCL-R does not
adequately track executive function, and some meas-
ures of executive function, including the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (WCST), may be too simplistic to
delineate psychopaths who are fully responsible for
their acts from those with diminished legal capacity.
Rationality and Criminal Culpability
Many legal scholars pose questions of criminal culpa-
bility in terms of legal rationality expressed in the
language of folk psychology. For example, Stephen
Morse argues that the law’s conception of the person
as a practical reasoner is inevitable given the nature of
the legal system: the law is meant to give people
reasons to act, or refrain from acting, and hence
requires that they be capable of acting for reasons.
According to Morse, “It is sufficient for responsibility
that the agent has the general capacity for rationality,
even if the capacity is not exercised on a particular
occasion” [15] (253). In turn, the lack of a general
capacity for rationality explains those cases where the
law excuses persons from responsibility. Morse
defines this general capacity as an underlying ability
to engage in certain behavior. If a person is capable of
certain conduct, it is fair to hold her responsible for
failing to engage in such conduct.
Morse fleshes out his account by including the
following capacities as constitutive of rationality: (1)
the ability to perceive the world accurately, form true
and justifiable beliefs; and (2) the ability to reason
“instrumentally, including weighing the facts appro-
priately and according to minimally coherent
preference-ordering” [15] (255). Weird or abnormal
desires themselves don’t make a person irrational un-
less she lacks the rational capacities to weigh and
order her desires. Therefore a person with disorders
of desire is excused only where a desire is so strong
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and overwhelming that he loses the capacity to be
guided by reason. Overall, the law’s standard for ra-
tionality is set fairly low, according to Morse, because
our legal system “has a preference for maximizing
liberty and autonomy” [15].
H. L. A. Hart called these general qualifying con-
ditions for criminal responsibility “capacity-responsi-
bility” [16]. According to Hart, capacity-responsibility
consists in “understanding, reasoning, and control of
conduct: the ability to understand what conduct legal
and moral rules require, to deliberate and reach deci-
sions concerning these requirements; and to conform
to decisions when made” [16] (227). These capacities
may be “diminished” or “impaired,” as well as wholly
lacking, “and persons may be said to be ‘suffering
from diminished responsibility’ much as a wounded
man may be said to be suffering from a diminished
capacity to control the movements of his limbs” [16]
(228).
The defense of diminished capacity recognizes that
some defendants may have decreased legal rationality
or capacity-responsibility, and allows a criminal de-
fendant to reduce the degree of the crime for which the
defendant may be convicted, even if the defendant’s
conduct satisfies all the elements of a higher offense
[17, 18]. Courts may also use the doctrine of dimin-
ished capacity to decrease the level of punishment at
sentencing. This “partial responsibility” application of
diminished capacity is justified by the principle of
proportionality, whereby punishment is moderated to
be proportional to both the harm caused and the type
of offender. Those who suffer from diminished capac-
ity are thought to be less responsible for their acts
because they do not have the capacity to form inten-
tions in the way that normal adults do.
Morse disagrees with the partial responsibility doc-
trine and argues that diminished capacity should only
be used to negate mens rea (where a defendant is
found not guilty) or ground an insanity plea [17]. He
then claims that psychopaths lack minimal rationality
such that they are eligible for a plea of legal insanity.
“Unless an agent is able to understand what the victim
will feel and is able to at least feel the anticipation of
unpleasant guilt for unjustifiably harming another, the
agent lacks the capacity to grasp and be guided by the
primary rational reasons for complying with legal and
moral norms” [15]. Thus Morse believes that the psy-
chopath’s lack of emotional data regarding his poten-
tial victim translates into a wholesale lack of
rationality, and proposes broadening the mental disor-
der criterion of the insanity defense to include psy-
chopathy as a sufficient mental abnormality to support
the defense.
Morse’s all or nothing approach to legal rationality
is quite difficult in application, however, especially
with regard to certain groups of offenders. Is a
14 year-old generally capable of understanding and
acting based upon the perceived consequences of his
acts? Is a person with an IQ of 70? The answer to these
questions is complex, and the language of folk psy-
chology is often inadequate when applied to the
extremes of human behavior. For example, when the
result of a behavior is particularly harmful, folk psy-
chology tends to err on the side of attributing full
responsibility (possibly despite evidence of abnormal
or substandard cognitive faculties) [19]. However, we
agree with Morse’s emphasis on the rational processes
underpinning legal responsibility. These processes are
what move us from beliefs and desires to action.
According to John Searle, “any definition of rational-
ity must presuppose a gap between the set of inten-
tional states on the basis of which I make my decision,
and the actual making of my decision” [20]. That is,
the antecedent set of beliefs and desires are not caus-
ally sufficient to determine the decision’s outcome. If
they were, no deliberation need occur: the decision is
“automatic,” not considered. According to Searle,
there are at least three gaps that rationality must fill.
The first is the gap in which you make up your mind
what to do. This gap is between the reasons for mak-
ing up your mind, and the actual decision made. The
second is the gap between decision and action: “There
comes a point, after making up your mind, where you
actually have to do it” [20]. The third is the gap
between initiation of the action and its continuation
to completion, i.e., the continuous voluntary effort
needed to stick to a plan until it is fulfilled. Within
these gaps identified by Searle are the processes that
compose rationality. Searle’s position, like Morse’s,
entails the view that a false or faulty belief or repre-
sentation isn’t usually enough to explain the unaccept-
able behavior of a rational person. In addition to
pointing to these intentional states and representations,
one must also examine the processes of rationality
within these three gaps. Further, a particular set of
abnormal desires or beliefs isn’t enough to excuse a
person from responsibility for his or her acts. Instead,
there are opportunities for the processes of rationality
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to recognize and correct for abnormal intentional
states. We believe that both legal rationality and
capacity-responsibility are best understood in terms
of executive function in the brain, and that the dimin-
ished capacity doctrine recognizes the reduced respon-
sibility of those with sub-par executive function.
Rationality and Executive Processes
As indicated above, although we believe that folk
psychology is generally correct in the way it classifies
mental states and processes [21], in certain cases it is
too blunt a tool. Thinking of rationality as accom-
plished by the set of executive processes allows for
much greater precision. Despite the almost unani-
mous agreement that responsibility under the crim-
inal law is dependent on some notion of rationality,
there is little agreement regarding how rationality
translates into scientific theories of cognition. This
is especially worrisome because criminal courts are
increasingly using scientific evidence of brain func-
tion to determine culpability, or during subsequent
sentencing. We have argued that proper executive
function is the scientific equivalent of legal ratio-
nality [22], and will argue below that some psycho-
paths have it and some don’t.
Most executive processes reside in the prefrontal
lobes, including the dorsolateral frontal lobes on the
side of the brain, the ventrolateral frontal lobes below
them, the medial prefrontal lobes on the inner surfaces
of the two hemispheres, and the orbitofrontal lobes
located on the brain’s undersurface just above the eye
sockets [23]. They function as parts of larger cortical
networks containing sensory and mnemonic areas
located in the posterior regions of the brain, supported
by subcortical nuclei. The following are thought by
most to be included in the set of executive processes:
attention, (considered) recognition, memory, decision-
making, the planning of intentional actions, and the
inhibition of actions. Each prefrontal area has its
executive specialities. Burgess states, for instance, that
area 10 in the polar prefrontal cortex, as well as the
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, are involved in the
“creation and maintenance of intentions” [24] (470).
Planning involves recalling items from memory and
merging them with other representations and plan seg-
ments already in consciousness. This requires activa-
tion of executive processes to verify the recalled
memories [25]. It also requires the ventrolateral cortex
to hold relevant information, contained in the posterior
cortices, online [26] while the dorsolateral cortex,
under the direction of the polar cortex, manipulates
that information. While all this is happening, execu-
tive sectors of the anterior cingulate are monitoring
this process for errors or inconsistencies [27], capable
of producing a strong alerting signal via the autonomic
system when one is found.
The executive processes tasked with monitoring
and correcting inaccurate perceptions (i.e., they pro-
duce what we call “considered recognition”: recogni-
tion that may need to be corrected by contextual or
mnemonic information) or memories themselves
(which again may need correcting) are especially im-
portant to rationality. Without them, people can be-
come confabulatory, or even delusional [28]. Or, they
can become psychopathic, with no ability to correct
for their cognitive-emotional deficits. Executive pro-
cesses involved in planning [29] are also crucial for
rationality, especially when one is planning actions
that will involve others. Our ability to correct for
perceptual deficits, or simply mistaken perceptions,
using our executive processes, is a vital part of our
rationality. Being rational is not so much a matter of
what you can perceive or what actions you can exe-
cute, but rather what you do with what you can per-
ceive and how you connect that to action.
Consider the example of Tom, a man who is com-
pletely color blind. This makes his representations of
the world abnormal in that they don’t contain infor-
mation most people have. Imagine Tom is arrested for
running a red light and hitting a pedestrian. He might
argue that, because he was incapable of perceiving the
traffic light normally, he shouldn’t be held responsible.
The police and prosecutors will not consider this in-
capacity to be an excuse for Tom’s behavior and the
harm he caused, however. Why? Because Tom has had
ample opportunities, in the gaps between his inten-
tional perceptual states (faulty as they may be) and his
behavior, to correct for his incapacity. Tom should
have noticed his problem and corrected for it, by
memorizing the position of the red light versus the
green. And if he was incapable of doing this, or if he
were driving in a foreign country where he didn’t
know which light means “stop,” he should not be
driving at all.
Similarly, consider Ted, a young person with au-
tism. While he is at the high-functioning end of the
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autism scale, Ted still sees others as unpredictable
“bags of skin,” and doesn’t understand that they have
mental states of pain and happiness as he does.
However, Ted has been taught by his parents and his
medical caregivers that when he directs action at an-
other person who then makes a face with a turned-
down mouth or says “stop” that he should stop what-
ever he is doing. Like most high-functioning autistics,
despite his lack of empathy, Ted acts morally due to
his consistent application of learned social or moral
rules [7]. And, if Ted were to commit a crime, his
social-perceptual deficit would not be considered an
excuse. What Tom and Ted have in common is that
they are able to use executive processing to correct for
their lack of relevant information. Both have to exert a
bit more effort to reason their way to correct behavior,
but they are capable of such behavior because they are
able to monitor and correct for inaccurate or incom-
plete perceptions. Our contention is that at least some
psychopaths are similar in important ways to Tom, or
to high-functioning autistics like Ted. Psychopaths
lack the capacity to build accurate representations of
the world because their representations lack the appro-
priate emotional salience or information about other’s
emotional states; but many successful psychopaths
have sufficient executive processing to have corrected
for this lack. Thus they are responsible for their acts.
Many unsuccessful psychopaths, however, might have
global incapacities in executive processing and thus
lack the ability to properly assess and correct (or at
least mitigate) their problems. These persons may not
be fully responsible for their behavior due to dimin-
ished mental capacity.
It seems important that both Tom and Ted are
aware of their cognitive deficits. If Tom had no idea
that color data informed people’s behavior, he might
be excused for running a red light. Similarly, if Ted
had no idea that people had mental states, he might be
excused for hurting someone. Persons who are color-
blind, and autistics, learn of their deficits fairly early
on as a part of the normal development process, and
because of this they have access to important reasons
for acting or inhibiting action (whether or not they are
actually swayed by these reasons) [30]. Tom and Ted
are able to employ rule-following to correct for per-
ceptual or representational lacks precisely because
they have the executive capacity to pay attention to
the morally relevant aspects of a situation, and to
determine whether certain learned rules should be
applied. Thus, at least according to certain theories
of responsibility, they may be considered agents de-
serving of praise or blame for their acts [30]. Not
surprisingly, the grounds for legal responsibility and
moral responsibility exhibit significant overlap from
the perspective of scientific psychology.
While a young psychopath may be less likely to be
diagnosed as having a deficit by a professional than
autistics, we think it is extremely likely that parents,
peers, and teachers, as well as the general culture, will
have provided information that he should care about
the mental states of others, and that there are moral
rules that he ought to follow in order to exhibit ethical
behavior. In general, there are sufficient environmental
cues to put psychopaths on notice that they have a
deficit, although only successful ones may have the
executive processing to properly identify and correct
for this deficit. If a successful psychopath can take
notice of his deficit, and has the capacity to employ
rules that would stop him from causing harm, he is
responsible for any harm he causes.
The Executive Function of Psychopaths
Each person has a different executive profile in that
her executive processes will vary in the overall role
they play in her psychology. Inhibition, for instance,
figures strongly in the mental lives of some people,
and very little in others. Some people are strongly
future-directed in that they seem to always be making
plans, sometimes in the long term, while others seem
never to think about a future more than a few hours
away, and spend very little time planning. Certain
combinations of motives and drives, coupled with
certain executive profiles, produce dangerous or toxic
results. For instance, combine the motive to steal with
an absence of inhibition, and you have a thief.
Research on the brain function of psychopaths has
focused on their emotional impairments. Blair,
Mitchell and Blair (2005) have argued that amygdala
function is impaired in psychopaths, leading to dys-
functional creation and processing of affect-laden rep-
resentations, particularly of others the psychopath may
harm [31]. Psychopaths may be similar to patients
with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) who are said to be suffering from “acquired
sociopathy” [32]. In persons with normal cognition,
the vmPFC tends to take emotional input from the
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amygdala and its extended network, and plays a role in
anticipating and modulating rewards and punishments
[33]. Motzkin et al. (2011) found reduced functional
connectivity between the vmPFC and amygdala in a
sample of psychopaths [34]. They also found reduced
structural integrity of the right uncinate fasciculus, the
primary white-matter connection between the vmPFC
and the anterior temporal lobe, which they suggest is
the ground of the reduced functional connectivity [34].
Adina Roskies claims that vmPFC patients have nor-
mal reasoning capacities, but are unmotivated to act
upon moral beliefs [35]. This may be due to their
inability to experience moral emotions such as empa-
thy. When asked to provide an answer to the famous
“trolley” thought experiment—where subjects are
asked to decide whether to intentionally kill one per-
son to save five—patients with ventromedial damage
are more likely to judge that intentionally killing the
one person (by pushing him onto trolley tracks) is the
right thing to do, despite their having an active role in
the killing. Thus, it is thought that persons with ven-
tromedial damage may be more likely to engage in
antisocial or immoral behavior, precisely because they
do not feel badly about such actions. Similarly, in an
fMRI study of fearful expression processing, Marsh et
al. reported reduced functional connectivity between
the amygdalae and the vmPFC in the children with
psychopathic tendencies [36]. Moreover, Birbaumer et
al. (2005) reported reduced vmPFC activity as well as
reduced amygdala activity in individuals with psy-
chopathy during aversive conditioning [37].
In 2000, Morgan and Lilienfeld conducted a meta-
analysis of the existing research on executive function
in people diagnosed as exhibiting antisocial behavior,
a large category that includes those diagnosed with
antisocial personality disorder, as well as those diag-
nosed as psychopathic [38]. While they note that the
existing research posed methodological issues and
produced equivocal results, on the whole, antisocial
behavior groups scored .62 standard deviations worse
on tests of executive function, which yielded a medi-
um to large effect size [38]. This included a finding of
response perseveration in a group diagnosed as psy-
chopathic [39, 40]. Since then, several attempts have
been made to delineate subtypes within the category of
psychopaths, partly in order to discern whether certain
groups might have more severe executive function
deficits. These possible subtypes include the classic
dist inct ion between primary and secondary
psychopaths [41]. Primary psychopaths show low lev-
els of anxiety, and have shown superior performance
on executive tasks such as the Stroop task [42], al-
though this has been attributed to their insensitivity to
peripheral information once they have established a
goal-directed focus of attention, rather than to superior
executive capacity [43, 44].
Recent research has distinguished two categories of
psychopath which appear to have very different exec-
utive profiles: successful psychopaths, with little or no
criminal record, and unsuccessful psychopaths, cur-
rently incarcerated or with a substantial criminal re-
cord. Gao and Raine recently published a review of
studies distinguishing the two populations within five
types of samples: a community recruited sample, indi-
viduals from temporary employment agencies, college
students, psychopaths employed in business and in-
dustry, and psychopathic serial killers [45]. Studies
suggest that unsuccessful psychopaths have reduced
prefrontal and amygdala volumes and hippocampal
abnormalities, resulting in reduced executive function-
ing, including impaired decision-making [45] (203).
Unsuccessful psychopaths also exhibit impaired auto-
nomic/somatic markers and fear-conditioning deficits
which contribute to poor and risky decision-making
[45] (203). In contrast, successful psychopaths do not
show similar structural and functional impairments of
the prefrontal cortex, amygdala and hippocampus [45]
(203). Ishikawa et al. found that successful psycho-
paths actually had greater autonomic responses than
both unsuccessful psychopaths and normal controls, as
measured by their heart rate reactivity during a task
designed to produce embarrassment and guilt: prepar-
ing and then delivering a two-minute speech detailing
their personal faults and weaknesses [12].
The Ishikawa et al. study also found that, compared
with unsuccessful psychopaths who had at least one
criminal conviction, successful psychopaths had en-
hanced executive functioning as measured by the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) [12]. The
WCST is used to assess the following frontal lobe
functions: strategic planning, organized searching,
shifting of cognitive sets, considered attention, and
modulating responses [12]. Indeed, successful psycho-
paths showed significantly better performance on the
WCST than non-psychopathic controls [12]. In con-
trast, unsuccessful psychopaths scored lower than the
controls, even though the two psychopathic groups did
not differ on full scale IQ compared with the controls
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[12]. Ishikawa and colleagues suggested that better
executive function might play a “protective” role for
successful psychopaths, decreasing their tendency to
be caught up in the criminal justice system [12]. This
executive profile may make successful psychopaths
particularly skilled at manipulation.
Almost all of these studies used the PCL-R for
identification of psychopathic populations. One prob-
lem with using the PCL-R to select subjects for studies
on successful versus unsuccessful psychopathy is that
one of its criteria for achieving a high enough score
(i.e., above 30) involves actual evidence of antisocial
behavior that a successful psychopath may have been
able to hide. Because of this, the vast majority of
studies on psychopaths use incarcerated subjects.
However, Ishikawa, et al. (2001), recruited subjects
from five temporary employment agencies in the
greater Los Angeles area, and then separated partic-
ipants into groups according to whether they had ever
been convicted of a crime. Participant’s self-reports
regarding convictions were then collaborated; e.g.
via conviction data derived from court records.
Unsuccessful psychopaths had higher total scores on
the PCL-R than the successful psychopaths, scoring a
mean of 31.5, compared with successful psychopaths
mean score of 27.7 [12]. However, this difference was
accounted for by the unsuccessful psychopaths’ higher
levels of antisocial behavior as assessed by Factor 2.
And as Ishikawa et al. note: “Importantly, the two
psychopathy groups did not differ on Factor 1, which
assesses the personality features that are considered
central to psychopathy (e.g., superficial charm, poor
empathy, callousness” [12]. Mullins-Sweat et al.
(2010) used a five-factor model (FFM) instead of the
PCL-R to identify successful psychopaths using
informants [46]. Psychologists with an interest in
law, attorneys, and clinical psychology professors
were sampled to obtain descriptions of individuals
they interacted with who exhibited signs of psychop-
athy and who were also successful in their endeavors
[46]. The results showed a consistent description
across professions and convergence with descriptions
of traditional psychopathy, though the successful psy-
chopathy profile had higher scores on conscientious-
ness [46]. We believe that Ishikawa et al.’s method of
moderating the PCL-R’s use of criminal activity as an
indicator of psychopathy when studying successful
psychopaths is especially promising. Since the stan-
dard deviation of the unsuccessful psychopath’s score
was 5.36, the psychopaths in the study can be seen as
clustering together [12]. The mean PCL-R score of the
control group was 10.85 [12].
One might argue that focusing on executive func-
tion inappropriately diverts attention away from a
well-studied hallmark of psychopathy: an inability to
make the conventional/moral distinction (see, e.g.,
[47]). When asked if it is acceptable for them to pull
another child’s hair if the teacher gave them permis-
sion, normal children say no, thus distinguishing be-
tween a conventional transgression and a moral one.
However, there is evidence that psychopaths believe
all transgressions are rule-dependent (and thus con-
ventional) [48, 49]. Turiel (1983) was one of the first
to argue for the distinction between moral and con-
ventional transgressions based on the sort of harm
caused [50]. Moral transgressions have effects on the
well-being of others, and are likely to cause distress to
persons; and conventional ones do not cause distress
to persons. Blair (1995) has suggested that affective
response to cues of distress grounds the distinction. He
argues that this affective response is connected to a
“violence inhibition mechanism” (VIM) that then
results in an aversion to distress cues and signals to
withdraw aggression (if the viewer of the cues is the
aggressor) [48]. People without high physiological
responses to distress cues, including psychopaths, are
said by Blair to have defective VIMs [48]. Nichols
(2002, 2004) also argues that the conventional/moral
distinction is grounded in negative affect [51, 52].
Nichols claims that the reason why certain etiquette
transgressions also seem to garner moral responses,
instead of being judged as convention, is because they
engender a disgust response which may also be prop-
erly classified as negative affect.
Given our theory, it may seem worrisome that
James and Blair (1996) found that autistic children
can make the distinction between conventional and
moral rules [53]. However, Blair (1999) also showed
that children with autism “do not lack the physiolog-
ical correlates of empathy” [54]. As Grant et al. state,
“[I]t may be that the physiological correlates of be-
havioral empathetic responsivity are sufficient for
making the distinction between moral and social con-
ventional rules and rule breaking (though not suffi-
cient for empathic behavioral responsivity)” [55].
Grant et al. (2005) also found that children with
autism were capable of making the conventional/mor-
al distinction, based upon assessment of the type of
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damage caused [55]. However, they postulate that
children with autism may have been explicitly taught
that damage to people is more culpable than damage to
objects and property [55]. To support this idea, they
note that justifications for making the distinction were
mediated by verbal ability [55].
Thus it seems autistics may feel a stronger affective
response to behavioral cues than at least some psycho-
paths. But they may also just be applying a fairly sophis-
ticated set of rules to make moral judgments. This
possibility is supported by the work of Kelly et al.
(2007), who found in a large internet-based study that
six of nine harm transgressions were not judged to be
authority independent [56]. Kelly et al. argue that many
of the earlier studies of the moral/conventional distinction
focused on “schoolyard harm transgressions” [56]. It is
very likely that subjects—primarily children, and includ-
ing autistic children—tested using these sorts of scenarios
would have been specifically taught rules governing these
sorts of transgressions. Successful psychopaths may also
be capable of learning a somewhat sophisticated rule set
regarding harmful transgressions. As argued above, this
ability to notice and correct for his perceptual lack would
make a successful psychopath criminally culpable.
Much remains to be sorted out concerning executive
function in psychopaths. However, whatever the ulti-
mate subcategories of psychopaths are found to be, it is
clear that there are substantial variations in the levels of
executive function within the existing group labeled as
psychopaths. Given the connections between executive
function and basic human rationality, as well as the
ability of executive function, when it exists, to correct
for emotional and perceptual deficits, we would argue
that those psychopaths who possess normal or above
normal executive function bear full responsibility for
their acts. Alternatively, psychopaths whose executive
function is substantially compromised should be con-
sidered less responsible. In what follows, we will as-
sume that those psychopaths with normal of above
normal executive function are successful psychopaths,
while those with below normal executive function are
unsuccessful, as indicated by the Ishikawa et al. study.
The Culpability of Successful versus Unsuccessful
Psychopaths
We have argued above and elsewhere that executive
function is the key to legal rationality and its
consequent legal culpability [22]. Juveniles, the men-
tally retarded, and the legally insane are populations
who may be less culpable due to diminished executive
function and thus, diminished mental capacity.
Similarly, unsuccessful psychopaths’ deficiencies in
executive processing may be severe enough to consti-
tute evidence of diminished mental capacity. Many
successful psychopaths, on the other hand, seem to
have a healthy enough executive profile to correct for
their lack of emotional empathy and thus are not
incapacitated enough to warrant an excuse. Criminal
laws are designed to be persuasive reasons not to act.
Like our colorblind driver, or the high-functioning
autistic person, successful psychopaths would seem
to have the ability to avoid violating the law. If an
offender is capable of (knowingly) following a law,
she is responsible when she does not.
If we are right and successful psychopaths have the
capacity to rule-follow, why don’t they? Put another
way, why do successful psychopaths fail to make
moral or ethical decisions if they don’t exhibit struc-
tural or functional impairments in their autonomic
systems, aren’t lacking in autonomic responses (at
least to some social situations), and exhibit normal
executive activity? Remember, successful psycho-
paths are still likely to make harmful or criminal
choices, even though they evade capture by law en-
forcement—many serial killers have been deemed
“successful” psychopaths. It may be that psychopaths
are more likely to have harmful desires because they
are self-centered [13]. There may also be less direct
environmental pressure placed on psychopaths to de-
velop and exercise their capacity to apply learned rules
to make up for their deficits. For example, in many
settings (institutional and personal) psychopaths may
be simply be punished for their acts, without being
offered resources to help them make better future
choices.
In addition, we suggest that the autonomic activity
and the executive activity in successful psychopaths
may fail to work together. In addition to coming at the
right time, i.e., when empathy is needed, autonomic
responses need to be within a certain range in order to
be of use in cognition. Too small, and they have no
effect on cognition. Too large, and they derail thought
and planning and make us their pawns (as may occur
in obsessive-compulsive disorder). In a study on a
large sample (37) of autistic children, we found that
the majority of them (70 %) showed skin-conductance
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responses (a measure of activity in the sympathetic
branch of the autonomic system) vastly greater than
those of normal [citation removed]. In addition, a
small subgroup (11 %) showed no autonomic respon-
siveness at all [57]. The effect of this under- and over-
responsiveness was the same: neither was of use for
developing or sustaining the capacity for normal
cognition.
Cognition without the proper influence of emotion
(or, more neutrally, the autonomic system)—regard-
less of whether it is too much or too little emotion—
may be aimless and subject to being sidetracked by
specious reasoning. The role of emotion in cognition
goes far beyond that of merely inhibiting us from
doing harmful, illegal, or counterproductive things. It
guides our reasoning, and can provide us with a sense
of how strong or weak an argument is. For example,
Baird discovered that adolescents take longer to make
moral decisions, partly because they have yet to de-
velop the “gut” feeling which requires one to stop
considering a decision when an immoral or harmful
result is realized [58]. Without this feeling, a strong
reason to do x and a weak reason to not do x can
appear to be equal. This can cause a phenomenon we
call “neutralizing,” in which a weak argument is con-
sidered to sufficiently counter a strong argument,
which neutralizes its effect on the person’s reasoning.
This sort of reasoning can allow one to derive any
conclusion she desires.
We suggest that those psychopaths with larger au-
tonomic responses but intact executive function may
have developed more extensive executive activity pre-
cisely in order to keep those responses from jolting
them off track, or causing them to engage in impul-
sive, unwise actions. As in the case of autistics, we
would expect this executive control to take the form of
learning and applying sets of rules to govern cogni-
tion. Unfortunately, these rules need not align with the
social rules of morality (e.g., members of the mafia are
governed by sets of rules) but they will indeed make
the successful psychopath, who is also likely to pos-
sess the traits of narcissism and Machiavellianism
[13], better able to achieve his goals. So while a mildly
autistic person (such as Ted) might use the rule “if you
see certain behavioral indicators of pain or disapprov-
al, stop,” without guidance a successful psychopath
might learn the rule “only cause behavioral indicators
of pain in places where others cannot see you.” The
successful psychopaths can alter their behavior based
on learned rules, but because of their malevolent
desires, the rules they learn may not make it less likely
that they cause criminal harm, but instead just make it
less likely they will be caught.
We suspect that the existing measures of executive
activity are unable to distinguish between genuine
critical reasoning and mere rule-following. Some of
the classical measures of executive activity, for in-
stance, are merely measures of the ability to follow
rules, with the WCST as a prime example. Indeed, the
most-cited finding of greater executive activity in suc-
cessful psychopaths [12] used the WCST as its mea-
sure. In principle, it would be possible to make this
distinction empirically, since critical reasoning would
draw on memory in different ways from rule-
following. Rule following would only require that
the rule itself be recalled, while critical reasoning
might tap memory at several points, in order to pro-
vide evidence for or against certain courses of action
based on past experience. Critical reasoning would
also require more creativity and greater openness to
the specific facts of the person’s current situation than
rule-following. We would expect rule-following psy-
chopaths to respond more quickly than normals
employing critical reasoning when the psychopaths
were in possession of a rule they could apply, but
more slowly (and with greater error rates) than nor-
mals if they did not know which rule to apply.
With regard to the culpability and punishment of
psychopaths, we agree with the “partial responsibility”
variant of the diminished mental capacity excuse and
feel that psychopaths with sub-par executive function
are deserving of less punishment than those who have
normal executive function. As criminal law theorist
Joshua Dressler notes, diminished capacity is relevant
to culpability because it is appropriate to for the court
to consider “any reasonably provable factor that tends
to demonstrate that the actors’ accountability for their
actions is less than that of normal persons under nor-
mal circumstances” [59]. Contra Morse, we do not feel
that psychopathy is best understood as a mental illness
which qualifies a defendant for legal insanity. Many
defendants who are successful in pleading insanity
suffer from schizophrenia and experience a hallucina-
tion or delusion relevant to the criminal harm caused
[60, 61]. We feel strongly not only that psychopathy is
not relevant to whether a defendant understands the
difference between right and wrong, an important
prong of the traditional test for insanity, but that courts
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will not perceive psychopaths as lacking this basic
moral understanding.
The difference between insanity and diminished
capacity is one of degree [59]. Psychopaths under-
stand the basic facts of their actions (where they are,
what they are doing), but some of them have lacking
or inappropriate affect. A psychopath who can correct
for this lack is fully responsible. A psychopath who
cannot should be able to attempt to prove the excuse of
diminished capacity. If successful, this excuse would
result in lesser culpability, and lesser punishment.
We understand that this is an unsavory prospect as
many unsuccessful psychopaths are likely to continue
to commit crimes. However, the future dangerousness
of a defendant is not relevant at the guilt phase of a
trial (which aims only to determine guilt regarding a
particular crime). At sentencing, future dangerous may
in some cases be considered (e.g. in capital cases).
However, in such cases diminished capacity may also
be considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
Imagine an analogous case: a defendant, Bob, has
an IQ of 60 and also has very bad desires to kill
women. Regardless of these desires, at trial the court
is only asked to determine Bob’s guilt with regard to a
particular crime. If his lower IQ corresponded to a
lower capacity to control the desires that resulted in
criminal harm, Bob should be eligible for the partial
responsibility variant of the diminished capacity ex-
cuse. At sentencing, the US Supreme Court has dis-
qualified Bob from the death penalty because of his
diminished capacity (see Atkins v. Virginia). It is
unfortunate that Bob has ongoing harmful desires.
But the criminal law is in the business of assessing
responsibility for harmful acts, not harmful desires.
(We hope the reasons that thoughts alone don’t engen-
der criminal culpability are obvious.) Unless there is a
minimally rational choice to cause criminal harm,
there is no criminal culpability. It is the decision to
act that the law cares about: Did the defendant have
the capacity to make this decision in a normal way
(where the bar for normal is rather low)? This is the
question of legal capacity.
For the law to be applied in a just manner, the
criteria for criminal culpability must be applied in a
systematic way to all persons. We think Morse’s
worries about the dangerousness of psychopaths may
ground his attempt to subsume them under the law of
legal insanity. If a psychopath were to be successful in
his plea of insanity, he would be incapacitated in a
mental hospital for just as long, or longer, than his
sentence would be if he were found guilty. But the
problem is that psychopaths aren’t insane. As students
are taught in law school, hard cases make bad law. It is
never a good idea to convolute legal concepts or
categories to accommodate a difficult case.
Conclusion
We have argued that the empirical ground of legal
rationality and thus criminal culpability resides in the
brain’s executive processes, and that successful psy-
chopaths are thus both more rational and more culpa-
ble than unsuccessful psychopaths. Successful
psychopaths fail to behave ethically, on our account,
because their autonomic activity fails to work in con-
cert with their executive activity, producing a reason-
ing style that is easily subverted by their malevolent or
selfish motives. However, we argue that successful
psychopath’s level of executive functioning could al-
low them to correct for their lack of appropriate auto-
nomic data. This may be why some treatment
regimens—namely, long term cognitive therapy—ap-
pear to be successful in reducing violence in persons
with psychopathy [62]. If a successful psychopath
were to be arrested for causing criminal harm, we
predict that, because they have intact executive func-
tions, they are more likely to benefit from such treat-
ment than unsuccessful psychopaths with executive
dysfunction.
Note that our position indicates that it might be
more appropriate to delineate psychopaths as
“healthy” and “unhealthy” or “functional” and “dys-
functional.” It is generally agreed that many successful
psychopaths do cause criminal harm and thus might be
caught up in the criminal justice eventually (just not
with the regularity of unsuccessful psychopaths).
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